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SUPREME COURT LEAKS AND RECUSALS:  A 
RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR STEVEN LUBET’S 
SCOTUS ETHICS IN THE WAKE OF NFIB V. 
SEBELIUS 
Kevin Hopkins∗ 
[P]eople know that something is wrong.  They sense the 
imbalances, the unfairness in the justice system.  They suspect 
that the playing field and the rules of the game favor the rich 
and powerful, but they may not know what to do about it.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Once upon a time, it would have been rare and almost unheard of to 
see a U.S. Supreme Court Justice give an interview on television or 
radio,2 attend a public function, give a speech or lecture, accept a gift 
from an organization with a particular political bend, discuss a decided 
case while still sitting on the Court, or go on a friendly hunting trip with 
a person who is a party-litigant in a lawsuit pending before the Court.3  
Times have changed, however. 
                                                 
∗ Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, IL.  I am grateful to 
Associate Dean Jeremy Telman and members of the faculty at Valparaiso University Law 
School for the invitation to participate in the roundtable discussion at the 2012 Tabor 
Lecture in Legal Ethics.  I am also grateful to the members of the Valparaiso University 
Law Review for providing great editorial assistance for this response.  Lastly, I thank 
Professor Steven Lubet for writing such a timely and provocative article and for delivering 
a great lecture. 
1 RALPH NADER & WESLEY J. SMITH, NO CONTEST:  CORPORATE LAWYERS AND THE 
PERVERSION OF JUSTICE IN AMERICA 193 (1996). 
2 On Sunday, January 13, 2013, CBS’s 60 Minutes aired a recent interview of Supreme 
Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor with CBS Television Anchor Scott Pelley.  See Justice 
Sotomayor Prefers “Sonia from the Bronx,” CBSNEWS (Jan. 13, 2013, 5:00 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=50138923n.  During the interview, Justice 
Sotomayor indicated that she had benefited from affirmative action, but was mindful and 
careful not to comment on Fisher v. University of Texas, the Court’s recent affirmative action 
case.  Id.  See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012) (granting a petition for writ of 
certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for review of the 
constitutionality of the University of Texas Law School admissions policies); Fisher v. Univ. 
of Tex., 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011) (considering the use of race in undergraduate 
admissions at the University of Texas). 
3 See Steven Lubet & Clare Diegel, Stonewalling, Leaks, and Counter-Leaks:  SCOTUS 
Ethics in the Wake of NFIB v. Sebelius, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 883, 889 (2013) (discussing 
numerous instances where the conduct of Justices have been questioned (e.g., the 
acceptance of gifts, outside speaking engagements, the accuracy of financial disclosure 
forms, recusal, confidentiality, etc.)); see also Kevin Hopkins, The Politics of Misconduct:  
Rethinking How We Regulate Lawyer-Politicians, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 839, 908–910 (2005) 
(providing a detailed discussion of the ethical concerns raised when Justice Antonin Scalia 
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The ethical conduct and behavior of members of the nation’s highest 
court have been questioned by the public and the legislature on many 
occasions.  For example, ethical concerns regarding the behavior of 
Supreme Court Justices have been raised in situations, just to name a 
few, where a Justice fails to recuse herself from participating in a 
decision when the Justice may have a personal stake in the outcome, 
such as holding stock in a corporation that is a litigant in a pending case 
before the Court,4 where a spouse of a Justice has taken a highly 
publicized position against a highly contested and debated law that is 
slated for Supreme Court review,5 or where a Justice has failed to recuse 
herself from participating in a case where she played an important if not 
key role in writing and advocating legislation that ultimately reaches the 
Court for constitutional review.6 
As Professor Steven Lubet notes in his article, Stonewalling, Leaks, and 
Counter-Leaks: SCOTUS Ethics in the Wake of NFIB v. Sebelius, the ethical 
conduct of Supreme Court Justices has once again gained national 
attention.  This time, however, the context for public outcry is due to 
actions of an in-house source who released confidential information to a 
member of the press concerning the voting behavior and the overall 
                                                                                                             
accompanied Vice President Dick Cheney on a duck hunting trip only three weeks after the 
Court had agreed to hear arguments in Cheney v. United States District Court, 540 U.S. 1088 
(2003)); David G. Savage, Trip With Cheney Puts Ethics Spotlight on Scalia:  Friends Hunt 
Ducks Together, even as the Justice Is Set to Hear the Vice-President’s Case, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 17, 
2004, at A-1 (providing details of the Scalia-Cheney trip); David G. Savage & Richard A. 
Serrano, Scalia Was Cheney Hunt Trip Guest; Ethics Concern Grows, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2004, at 
A-12 (opining that as more details of the trip have emerged, the impartiality of Justice 
Scalia is in doubt).  In a response to the Los Angeles Times inquiry, Justice Scalia stated: 
Social contacts with high-level executive officials (including cabinet 
officers) have never been thought improper for judges who may have 
before them cases in which those people are involved in their official 
capacity, as opposed to their personal capacity.  For example, Supreme 
Court Justices are regularly invited to dine at the White House, 
whether or not a suit seeking to compel or prevent certain presidential 
action is pending. 
Savage, supra. 
4 See John Berlau, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Fails to Recuse Herself, INSIGHT MAG., July 28, 
1997, at 12 (noting that Justice Ginsburg had failed to recuse herself in Bankers Trust Co. v. 
Procter & Gamble Co., 516 U.S. 1041 (1996) and Exxon Corp. v. Youell, 516 U.S. 801 (1995), 
cases where her husband owned stock in one of the litigating companies). 
5 See Joan Biskupic, Calls for Recusal Intensify in Health Care Case:  Kagan, Thomas 
Questioned, USA TODAY, Nov. 21, 2011, at 6A (noting concerns raised by House Democrats 
that Justice Thomas recuse himself from participating in the Court’s review of the 
constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act because of his wife’s vigorous and public 
opposition to the law). 
6 See id. (noting concerns raised by Republican Senator Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) 
concerning Justice Elena Kagan’s involvement while Solicitor General of the United States 
in the defense of the Affordable Care Act). 
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sentiments of members of the Court’s minority in one of the most 
significant and controversial rulings of the year:  NFIB v. Sebelius (the 
“Affordable Care Act”).7  Professor Lubet uses this leaking of significant 
and confidential information regarding the Court’s deliberations in the 
Affordable Care Act case as a segue into what he believes is a much 
larger group of issues—those concerning Supreme Court ethics and 
regulation of the conduct of members of the Court, the need for the 
adoption by the Court of a comprehensive code of judicial conduct to 
govern the actions of the Justices, and the need for reform of the Court’s 
recusal process and practices.8 
Just like Professor Lubet, I also signed the nonpartisan letter that was 
drafted and sent by a group of law professors to the Chairman and 
Ranking Minority Members of the Senate and House Judiciary 
Committees, which called for the implementation of mandatory and 
enforceable rules to protect the integrity of the Supreme Court.9  And just 
like Professor Lubet, members of academia, and the sponsors of H.R. 
862,10 I too believe that the adoption of ethics rules to govern Supreme 
Court Justices would provide greater transparency with regards to 
judicial decision-making at the Supreme Court level and consistency in 
practices such as recusal, and would bolster public confidence in the 
integrity of the Court.  However, unlike Professor Lubet, I believe that 
the uniqueness of the Supreme Court and its role as contemplated by the 
Constitution’s Framers will require, in many instances, deference by the 
legislative branch of the national government, even when the conduct by 
a Justice might otherwise raise significant ethical concerns.11 
In my response, I briefly evaluate the validity of a few of Professor 
Lubet’s comments and arguments addressing some of these issues, the 
viability of his suggestion for adopting a comprehensive code of judicial 
                                                 
7 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012); see also Lubet, supra note 3, at 883–86. 
8 See generally Lubet, supra note 3; see also 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2006) (discussing 
disqualification of justices, judges, and magistrate judges). 
9 See Letter from 138 Law Professors to the House and Senate Judiciary Comms. (Mar. 
17, 2011), available at http://www.afj.org/judicial_ethics_sign_on_letter.pdf (providing the 
letter to Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members regarding the adoption of a 
comprehensive code of judicial ethics for Supreme Court Justices). 
10 See H.R. 862, 112th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (2011) (establishing procedures for recusal of 
Supreme Court Justices).  House Bill 862 was introduced by Congressmen Chris Murphy 
(D-Conn.) and Anthony Weiner (D-N.Y.).  Id.  The Bill would apply the Judicial 
Conference’s Code of Conduct to Supreme Court Justices and would give the Judicial 
Conference the ability to enforce the Code of Conduct when violated by a Justice.  Id. § 2. 
11 See CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN ROBERTS, 2011 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 
(Dec. 31, 2011), http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2011year-endreport. 
pdf (making a case for not adopting a comprehensive code of judicial ethics on the grounds 
of the uniqueness of the Supreme Court). 
Hopkins: Supreme Court Leaks and Recusals:  A Response to Professor Steven
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2013
928 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47 
conduct to govern members of the Court, and his ideas for reforming the 
Court’s recusal process.  I conclude by sharing a few of my own thoughts 
and suggestions on these important issues. 
II.  THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 
Article III, Section 1 of the United States Constitution provides: 
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested 
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the 
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.  
The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, 
shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and 
shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a 
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during 
their Continuance in Office.12 
The U.S. Supreme Court is the only federal court specifically 
mandated under Article III of the Constitution.13  Justices sitting on the 
Court have assumed as their major responsibilities the task of assuring 
state and federal government compliance with the Constitution and 
other federal laws, along with the task of acting as a check on the 
exercise of powers by the executive and legislative branches of the 
national government. 
In Federalist No. 78, Alexander Hamilton stated that the judiciary 
branch was “designed to be an intermediate body between the people 
and the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter 
within the limits assigned to their authority.”14  As noted by Hamilton, 
the Court was created primarily as a check on the executive and 
legislative branches of the national government for the protection of the 
people.15  The Framers believed that to best protect the people the 
judicial offices required a cloak of permanent tenure in order to create 
the independent spirit in judges essential for the faithful performance of 
the duties of that role.16 
                                                 
12 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
13 Id. 
14 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 404 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James 
McClellan eds., Liberty Fund 2001). 
15 Id. at 406–07. 
16 Id. at 407; see also N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 59–60 
(1982) (holding that a fundamental principle enunciated in the Constitution is that the 
“‘judicial Power of the United States’ must be [placed] in an independent Judiciary” and 
that the Constitution provides “clear institutional protections for that independence,” such 
as the salary and tenure provisions of Article III of the Constitution).  Supreme Court 
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Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution states: 
 The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law 
and Equity, arising under [the] Constitution, the Laws of 
the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting 
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;—to 
all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to 
Controversies to which the United States shall be a 
Party;—to Controversies between two or more States;—
between a State and Citizens of another State;—between 
Citizens of different States;—between Citizens of the 
same State claiming Land under the Grants of different 
States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and 
foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.17 
Article III of the Constitution provides the Supreme Court with original 
jurisdiction to adjudicate cases affecting ambassadors, other public 
ministers and consuls, and those in which a state is a party.18  
Additionally, the Constitution provides that in all other cases the Court 
has appellate jurisdiction both as to law and fact with such exceptions 
and regulations as created by Congress.19 
While Article III of the U.S. Constitution provides for the creation of 
the Supreme Court, it is silent with regards to what specific disciplinary 
actions are available when a Justice commits conduct unbecoming of 
good behavior while in office.  The Impeachment Clause of the 
Constitution, however, empowers Congress to impeach and remove 
from office all civil officers of the United States for conviction of treason, 
bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.20  Because Supreme 
Court Justices are civil officers of the United States, the Constitution 
makes impeachment and removal from office the only political check 
available to the legislative branch for regulating the behavior of Supreme 
Court Justices.21 
                                                                                                             
Justices and other federal judges serve life-time tenures unless their conduct falls below the 
“good behaviour” threshold contemplated by the Framers.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
17 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
18 Id. § 2, cl. 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (2006). 
19 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
20 Id. § 2, cl. 5. 
21 See id. art. II, § 4.  Other constitutional checks available to Congress with regards to 
Supreme Court Justices are its power to control the size of the Court, thus affecting the 
number of Justices required to constitute a quorum and the qualifications for serving as a 
Justice.  See Louis J. Virelli III, The (Un)Constitutionality of Supreme Court Recusal Standards, 
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Consequently, if the Court were to adopt its own code of conduct (as 
will be discussed later) to use as guidance or as the sole governing 
authority for making decisions that involve potential ethical concerns 
(e.g., recusal, gifts, conflicts of interests, bias, etc.), the code would be, at 
best, only aspirational and would have no authoritative or practical 
effect on the individual Justices.  As discussed earlier, attempting to 
discipline a Justice for breach of an ethics code provision, short of 
conduct that would constitute an offense sufficient to impeach and 
remove the Justice from office (e.g., criminal actions brought against a 
sitting Justice), would run contrary to the Framer’s intent for the 
independence of the Court and the “clear institutional protections for 
that independence” as provided for under the Constitution.22 
Finally, as noted by Professor Lubet and legal scholars, any ethics 
code and its enforceability against the Justices would be subject to 
judicial review by the Court.23  Consequently, the Court would have the 
final say in determining the constitutionality of any legislation, such as 
H.R. 862, that would require the Court to adopt and adhere to the Code of 
Conduct for United States Judges (“Code of Conduct”), notwithstanding the 
fact that such a code would directly affect the Court’s own self-interest. 
III.  THE NEED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT TO 
GOVERN SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 
In his paper, Professor Lubet persuasively argues that the Supreme 
Court should adopt a comprehensive code of conduct primarily to let the 
public know what to expect from the Justices.24  In support of this 
argument, he references both the letter submitted by law professors 
across the country to the Chairman and ranking members of the U.S. 
Senate and House Judiciary Committees, which requested the Justices 
adopt mandatory and enforceable rules to protect the integrity of the 
Court, and H.R. 862 (“Supreme Court Transparency and Disclosure Act 
of 2011”), which would require that the Code of Conduct be applicable and 
                                                                                                             
2011 WIS. L. REV. 1181, 1221 (2011) (discussing several constitutional arguments made in 
support of congressional involvement in the Supreme Court recusal process). 
22 See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 60 (1982) (noting 
that the Constitution provides clear institutional protections for the independence of the 
Court); see also Hopkins, supra note 3, at 908–10 (discussing Supreme Court discipline and 
the Scalia-Cheney duck hunting trip). 
23 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177–78 (1803) (upholding judicial 
review of decisions of the executive and judicial branches as a proper function of the Court 
under the Constitution); see also Lubet, supra note 3. 
24 See Lubet, supra note 3, at 890–91. 
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enforceable against Supreme Court Justices.25  As additional support for 
this position, Professor Lubet evaluates and critiques the response given 
by Chief Justice Roberts in his 2011 Year-End Report on the Federal 
Judiciary, a response addressing recent public pressure and criticisms 
lodged against the Court regarding its lack of a comprehensive code of 
conduct and the Court’s recusal process.26 
Professor Lubet correctly notes that the lower federal courts have 
adopted the Code of Conduct, one that is similar to the ABA’s Model Code 
of Judicial Conduct, which has been adopted by the various states.27  He 
acknowledges that Supreme Court Justices may encounter issues and 
situations that would never arise for federal and state court judges.28  
However, he embraces the view that this fact alone provides little reason 
for the Court’s refusal to adopt and abide by a comprehensive code of 
judicial conduct.29  Professor Lubet concludes and implies, like many 
others, that because the lower federal and state courts have adopted and 
are subject to codes of judicial conduct, then it is reasonable and logical 
that the Supreme Court act similarly and accordingly.30 
Professor Lubet’s assessments and conclusions are reasonable and 
facially valid.  Chief Justice Roberts has noted that the Court does not 
have to adopt a comprehensive code of ethics as its “definitive source of 
ethical guidance,” primarily because it already considers not only the 
Code of Conduct applicable to lower federal court judges, but also other 
sources such as judicial opinions, treatises, scholarly articles, and 
disciplinary decisions when deciding ethical issues.31  However, as 
Professor Lubet specifically points out, these sources are equally 
available to and utilized by lower federal and state court judges, yet this 
has not prevented those judges from establishing and attempting to 
follow a uniform and comprehensive ethics code.32 
                                                 
25 Id. at 887–88; see also supra notes 9–10 (discussing H.R. 862 and letters by law 
professors to ranking members of the Senate and House Judiciary Committees). 
26 See Lubet, supra note 3, at 887–91 (discussing Chief Justice Robert’s 2011 Year-End 
Report on the Federal Judicary and recusal challenges made during deliberations in NFIB v. 
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566). 
27 CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES (2011), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/CodesOfConduct/CodeConductUnitedState
sJudges.aspx#; ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2011), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibil
ity/2011_mcjc_table_of_contents.authcheckdam.pdf. 
28 See Lubet, supra note 3, at 890–91. 
29 Id.  
30 Id.  
31 ROBERTS, supra note 11, at 5. 
32 Lubet, supra note 3, at 888. 
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I agree with Professor Lubet on this point.  Justice Roberts’s defense 
for refusing to consider the value to be gained by adopting a 
comprehensive code for the Court is very weak and simplistic.  Even the 
Chief Justice acknowledges that the Code of Conduct plays the same role 
for the Justices as it does for other federal judges by providing guidance 
on acceptable and unacceptable conduct.33  Although he suggests that 
there is no need to adopt a specific code of conduct for the Court, there 
seems to be no compelling reason provided in his annual report not to.  
Because of the nature and the types of cases which are heard and 
decided by the Court each year and the fact that the ramifications of 
those decisions most often extend well past the litigants, the Court’s 
adoption of its own code would serve as an additional reminder to the 
public that the Justices too are mindful of the need to be impartial when 
deciding all cases and would help to insure that their decisions are free 
from the constraints of politics and outside influences.34 
In further defense of the Court’s refusal to adopt a comprehensive 
ethics code, Chief Justice Roberts notes that the Code of Conduct “cannot 
answer all questions” and “does not adequately answer some of the 
ethical considerations unique to the Supreme Court.”35  I agree with 
Professor Lubet who correctly concludes that this would be the case, 
however, for all judges who seriously strive towards justice, fairness, 
and judicial integrity.  Like any code of conduct, the Code followed by 
the lower federal courts could be tweaked, revised, or altered to take into 
consideration the special and unique ethical issues that arise in the 
Supreme Court. 
I also agree with Professor Lubet that it is the decision by the Court 
to adopt a comprehensive code of conduct, and not so much as to what 
that code would look like or actually include, that is really important.  
No one code could encompass every possible ethical dilemma that a 
judge may have to confront on any given day during her tenure on a 
                                                 
33 ROBERTS, supra note 11, at 5. 
34 See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (reviewing the 
constitutionality of an Arizona statute designed to address the growing number of 
unlawful aliens in the state); NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (reviewing the 
constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 
(2011) (reviewing the district court’s certification of a half million plaintiffs in a class action 
suit); McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (reviewing the constitutionality of a 
City of Chicago ordinance placing a ban on possession of handguns); Citizens United v. 
Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (reviewing the constitutional limits on 
electioneering communications and holding that the First Amendment prohibits 
government from restricting independent political campaign expenditures by corporations 
and unions); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding the affirmative action 
admissions policies at the University of Michigan Law School). 
35 ROBERTS, supra note 11, at 5. 
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court.  However, the Supreme Court’s adoption of a comprehensive code 
would help to guarantee greater uniformity, consistency, and integrity in 
its handling of these unique concerns. 
An important concern that Professor Lubet spends very little time 
addressing, however, is the constitutionality of his proposal that the 
Court adopt a code of conduct.  Such a proposal could raise a significant 
constitutional issue if the adoption of a code of conduct is legislatively 
mandated (as contemplated by the drafters of H.R. 862) or self-imposed 
by the Court.  A legislatively mandated code, as contemplated by the 
drafters of H.R. 862, would pose serious constitutional problems.36 
As Chief Justice Roberts has indicated, Article III of the Constitution 
creates only one court that is the Supreme Court of the United States, 
and it empowers Congress to establish additional lower federal courts.37  
Although it is within Congress’s power to create the Judicial Conference 
and provide direction to this entity, the Conference and its members 
would have no constitutional authority to prescribe rules and standards 
for the Supreme Court.38  Under the nation’s governmental structure, the 
judiciary is the body that normally creates rules that govern its 
operation—not the legislature.  Introducing and enacting legislation 
designed to require that the Supreme Court adopt and comply with the 
Code of Conduct would run afoul of Article III’s mandate that the “judicial 
Power of the United States” be vested in one Supreme Court, the 
Framer’s intent to create the independence necessary for the Court to act 
as the check on both branches of the national government, and the 
separation of powers envisioned by the Framers when they created the 
legislative, executive, and judicial branches of our governmental 
structure.39  Finally, any legislative action purporting to require the 
Court to adopt the Code of Conduct would be subject to judicial review by 
the Court.40 
IV.  SUPREME COURT RECUSAL PRACTICE 
Lastly, Professor Lubet argues that the Court’s current recusal 
practices are in need of reform.41  He contends that the Court’s long-
standing practice when considering a party’s request for recusal or an 
                                                 
36 See supra note 10 (discussing H.R. 862). 
37 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1. 
38 Id.; see also ROBERTS, supra note 11, at 4 (referencing Article III’s provision providing 
Congress the ability to create lower federal courts and its power to create the Judicial 
Conference). 
39 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
40 See supra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing judicial review). 
41 Lubet, supra note 3, at 891–902. 
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individual Justice’s decision to step down from participating in a case 
based upon personal bias—such as previous involvement in the 
litigation prior to his or her appointment to the bench or other conflicts—
has been one that is secretive and left entirely to the Justice in question.42  
He argues that the Supreme Court’s recusal process is inconsistent and 
problematic.43  Unlike lower federal and state courts where recusal 
decisions may be reviewed by higher courts or the chief judge, the 
Supreme Court has no review process in place.44  Finally, as a possible 
solution against individual decision-making by the Justices on the issue 
of recusals, Professor Lubet suggests that the Court could adopt a 
process that would require either full Supreme Court review on the issue 
of disqualification of a member Justice or a more radical process that 
might require retired Justices and senior circuit court judges to 
participate in a Justice’s denial of a recusal motion.45 
Section 455 of Title 28 of the U.S. Code provides direction and 
guidance for lower-ranking federal court judges in determining whether 
a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be compromised, thus requiring 
the judge to recuse herself from the proceeding.46  The statute requires 
disqualification, for example, where a judge’s impartiality might 
                                                 
42 Id. at 894–95. 
43 Id.  
44 Id. at 895–97. 
45 Id.; H.R. 862, 112th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a)(2)–(b) (2011).  Section 3(a)(2) through (b) of 
H.R. 862 provides: 
(a)(2) DENIAL OF DISQUALIFICATION MOTION—If a justice of 
the Supreme Court denies a motion brought by a party to a 
proceeding before the Court that the justice should be 
disqualified in the proceeding under section 455 of such title, 
the justice shall disclose in the public record of the 
proceeding the reasons for the denial of the motion. 
(b) PROCESS FOR DETERMINING RECUSAL—The Judicial 
Conference of the United States shall establish a process 
under which, if a disqualification motion has been denied as 
described in subsection (a)(2) and the party making the 
motion seeks further review of the motion, other justices or 
judges of a court of the United States (as defined in section 
451 of title 28, United States Code), among whom retired 
justices and senior judges eligible for assignment under 
section 294 of title 28, United States Code, may be included, 
shall decide whether the justice with respect to whom the 
motion is made should be so disqualified. 
Id. 
46 See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2006) (“Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United 
States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned.”). 
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reasonably be questioned.47  Although the statute on its face includes the 
term “justice,” which is defined to include the Chief Justice and the 
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court,48 the Supreme Court has not 
spoken on the constitutionality of this statute.  Consequently, the Court’s 
actions have implied that the statute, with respect to lower federal court 
judges, would be an appropriate exercise of congressional powers. 
Although Chief Justice Roberts has stated that the Code of Conduct 
applies only to lower federal court judges, he has indicated that the 
Justices follow the same general principles respecting recusal as other 
federal judges, but the application of those principals may differ 
depending on the unique circumstances of the Supreme Court.49  As 
previously discussed, Article III gives Congress the power to create 
additional lower federal courts, and the Judicial Conference of the 
United States was established for the sole benefit of those federal 
courts.50  Consequently, the Judicial Conference’s Committee on Codes 
of Conduct has no power to mandate or prescribe rules or standards for 
any other body.51  Justice Roberts acknowledges, however, that the Court 
has internally agreed to apply the disqualification standards of the Code 
of Conduct imposed upon lower federal court judges in the areas of 
financial disclosures and limitations on gifts and outside income.52 
On March 1, 2011, House of Representative Members Chris Murphy 
and Anthony Weiner introduced the Supreme Court Transparency and 
Disclosure Act of 2011, a bill designed to require that the Code of Conduct 
be applied to the Justices of the Supreme Court and to articulate a set of 
formal procedures for the recusal of Justices.53  House Bill 862 would 
require that:  (1) the Code of Conduct for federal judges apply to the 
Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court to the same extent as it would apply 
to circuit and district court judges; (2) the Judicial Conference establish 
procedures for handling complaints alleging that a Justice has violated 
the Code of Conduct and take appropriate actions with respect to those 
complaints; (3) Justices who disqualify themselves disclose the reason for 
the disqualification in the public record of the proceeding; (4) Justices 
who deny a motion for disqualification brought by a party against the 
Justice under § 455 of Title 28 of the U.S. Code disclose the reasons for 
denial of the motion in the public record of the proceeding; and (5) the 
                                                 
47 See id. § 455(b) (providing a list of circumstances for which disqualification would be 
required). 
48 See 28 U.S.C. § 451 (2006). 
49 ROBERTS, supra note 11, at 5. 
50 See supra note 12. 
51 ROBERTS, supra note 11, at 4. 
52 Id. at 6. 
53 See supra note 10. 
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Judicial Conference establish a formalized process for addressing review 
of a Justice’s denial of a disqualification motion lodged against the 
Justice.54 
Once again, imposing or mandating legislatively created procedures 
or rules to govern Supreme Court recusals runs afoul of Article III’s 
mandate that the power of the judicial branch shall be vested in “one” 
Supreme Court.55  Similar to the promulgation of judicial codes of 
conduct, decisions regarding recusals fall within the constitutional 
parameters of the judicial branch of our national government.56  Clearly, 
the Court has the ability to decide upon the process that it will use for 
handling recusals.57  Thus, a legislatively imposed requirement that the 
Court adopt the Code of Judicial Conduct of United States Judges, as would 
be the case under H.R. 862, would trigger separation of powers concerns 
as outlined in Article III of the Constitution.58 
Furthermore, imposing the requirements of H.R. 862 or similar 
legislative provisions requiring the creation of review panels consisting 
of lower federal courts, such as the chief judge of the court of appeals 
and members of U.S. district courts, or having the Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court evaluate a Justice’s decision to recuse herself when 
requested by a litigant in a proceeding or a Justice’s individual decision 
to recuse herself from participating in a proceeding, would not only 
create the awkward situation of placing members of the lower courts in 
the position to review a Supreme Court Justice’s recusal decision, but 
also having the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court review and make 
decisions as to whether an individual Justice would or should have to 
recuse herself.59  Each of these scenarios infringe upon the Court’s 
powers under Article III and the independence envisioned by the 
Framers when they created the Constitution.  Lastly, under its powers of 
judicial review, the Court would have the final say with regards to the 
constitutionality of any legislative enactment requiring it to act similarly 
to lower federal court judges when determining disqualification or when 
ruling on recusal motions by litigants. 
                                                 
54 H.R. 862, 112th Cong., 1st Sess. (2011). 
55 See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text (discussing Article III of the U.S. 
Constitution). 
56 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.  
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 See Savage, supra note 3, at A-12 (discussing Vice President Dick Cheney’s hunting 
trip with Justice Antonin Scalia).  In defending Justice Scalia’s actions, the late Chief Justice 
William Rehnquist stated that there were no formal procedures for in-house review by the 
Court of the decisions of a Justice in an individual case and that it was ill-considered for the 
Senators to suggest that Justice Scalia recuse himself in the pending litigation.  Id. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Professor Lubet has raised a badly needed dialogue on the Supreme 
Court’s lack of a comprehensive code of conduct and its failure to act 
consistently with regards to handling ethical issues that arise before it.60  
As noted by Professor Lubet, the Chief Justice’s reasoning in support of 
the Court’s decision not to adopt a code, or to create more transparency 
with regards to the current recusal process, is unpersuasive at best.61  
Yes, the Supreme Court is in a unique position under the Constitution, 
and legislation designed to require the Court to adopt the Code of Conduct 
would raise serious constitutional issues.  This, however, does not or 
should not prevent the Court from adopting and promulgating its own 
code of conduct. 
As noted by the Chief Justice, a code of conduct is “designed to 
provide guidance to judges.”62  As Professor Lubet concludes, the 
adoption of a comprehensive code by the Court is simply the right thing 
to do.63  It would tend to create greater transparency regarding the 
Court’s handling of ethical concerns and greater consistency amongst the 
Justices when dealing with issues such as recusal.  Finally, the Court’s 
adoption of its own code of conduct would begin the process of 
removing much of the secrecy that currently exists with respect to the 
Court’s recusal and disqualification practices—secrecy that so often 
creates public outcry when members of the Court act in ways that create 
the appearance of impropriety. 
As evidenced in the Chief Justice’s report, the Court does care about 
the public’s perception of the integrity of its members.64  Thus, my 
suggestion to Professor Lubet and others who care about fairness and the 
integrity of the Court would be to continue to keep these important 
ethical issues in the public eye.  As discussed previously, although a 
legislatively mandated code or requirement that the Court adopt a code 
of conduct could be problematic, applying public pressure on the Court 
to adopt its own code would be both feasible and appropriate.  If the 
public letter submitted by law professors to high-ranking members of 
the House and Senate Judiciary Committees was sufficient to prompt the 
Chief Justice to respond officially, then what would be the effect of 
letters from state supreme court and lower court judges requesting the 
Court to adopt a code of ethics and to rethink its current recusal and 
                                                 
60 See generally Lubet, supra note 3. 
61 Id. 
62 ROBERTS, supra note 11, at 4 (citation omitted). 
63 Lubet, supra note 3, at 904–05. 
64 See generally ROBERTS, supra note 11. 
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disqualification process?  The Court’s response and answer to this 
important question might very well be surprising. 
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